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GOVERNMENT SPEECH 
AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
Helen Norton* 
INTRODUCTION 
The government is unique among speakers because of its coercive power, 
its substantial resources, its privileged access to national security and 
intelligence information, and its wide variety of expressive roles as 
commander-in-chief, policymaker, educator, employer, property owner, and 
more.  Precisely because of this power, variety, and ubiquity, the 
government’s speech can both provide great value and inflict great harm to 
the public.  In wartime, specifically, the government can affirmatively choose 
to use its voice to inform, inspire, heal, and unite—or instead to deceive, 
divide, bully, and silence. 
This Article examines the U.S. government’s role as speaker (rather than 
as regulator of speech) in its War on Terror, drawing from historical and 
contemporary examples to illuminate the great power of the government’s 
wartime expression.  As we shall see, on the one hand, the government’s 
expressive choices in wartime can be enormously valuable.  On the other 
hand, the government has also engaged in wartime fearmongering and lies, 
with at times devastating effects not only on its intended targets but also on 
the American public.1  Many of the challenges involving the government’s 
speech in today’s War on Terror are familiar (often painfully so), while some 
seem different in degree and perhaps even in kind. 
Although courts and commentators have discussed at some length the First 
Amendment issues raised by the government’s restriction of others’ speech 
as part of its War on Terror,2 relatively little attention has yet been devoted 
 
*  Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado 
School of Law.  Thanks to Lydia Lulkin and Eddie Ramirez for outstanding research assistance 
and to Catherine Tremble for excellent editorial assistance.  Thanks too for thoughtful 
comments to Brad Bernthal, Deb Cantrell, Kristen Carpenter, Alan Chen, Ming Chen, Danielle 
Keats Citron, Rick Collins, Kristelia Garcia, RonNell Andersen Jones, Heidi Kitrosser, Sarah 
Krakoff, Genevieve Lakier, Kyle Langvardt, Lyrissa Lidsky, Pierre Schlag, Anna Spain, 
Alexander Tsesis, Ahmed White, and participants in the Fordham Law Review symposium 
entitled Terrorist Incitement on the Internet held at Fordham University School of Law, Yale 
Law School’s Free Expression Scholars Conference, and workshops at the University of 
Colorado School of Law and the University of Utah Law School.  For an overview of the 
Fordham Law Review symposium, see Alexander Tsesis, Foreword:  Terrorist Incitement on 
the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2017). 
 
 1. See infra Parts I–II. 
 2. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–16 (2010); Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 638 (2014); Thomas Healy, 
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to the implications of the government’s own expression in this setting.  Apart 
from its interpretation of the Establishment Clause to limit the government’s 
religious speech in certain contexts,3 for example, the U.S Supreme Court’s 
government speech doctrine remains incomplete in that it has yet to address 
the ways in which the government’s own speech might affirmatively threaten 
other constitutional values.4 
This Article examines how the government’s speech in the War on Terror 
can threaten free speech, equal protection, and due process values.5  It focuses 
primarily on the constitutional harms threatened by the government’s speech 
itself (what some call a form of “soft law”),6 rather than on situations in 
which the government’s speech may be evidence of a constitutionally 
impermissible motive for its “hard law” actions.7 
Part I of this Article considers the government’s fearmongering speech in 
wartime—its deliberate expressive effort to instill or exacerbate public fear 
of certain individuals or communities through stereotyping and scapegoating.  
Next, Part II considers the government’s war-related lies—its deliberately or 
recklessly false assertions of fact about its wartime conduct made with the 
intent that its listeners understand them to be true.8  Finally, Part III outlines 
a range of constitutional, statutory, structural, and political responses to the 
government’s wartime speech that threaten key constitutional values. 
I begin with a few notes about this Article’s use of the terms “government 
speech” and “war.”  First, this Article considers a wide range of government 
speakers.  Although a great deal of the government’s wartime speech 
 
Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 657–61 (2009); Wadie E. 
Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1455, 1498–508; Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 651, 662–75 (2017). 
 3. E.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989) (holding that a 
county holiday display that included a crèche constituted governmental religious expression 
in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 4. The Supreme Court’s government speech doctrine recognizes simply that the 
government’s own expressive choices are exempt from Free Speech Clause claims by private 
parties who claim a constitutional right to join or change the government’s chosen message. 
E.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
 5. Elsewhere, I have addressed the potential harms of government speech more 
generally. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 
89–107 (2015) [hereinafter, Norton, Government’s Lies] (exploring possible Due Process and 
Free Speech Clause constraints on certain government speech); Helen Norton, The Equal 
Protection Implications of Government’s Hateful Speech, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, 183–
87 (2012) [hereinafter, Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech] (exploring possible Equal 
Protection Clause limits on certain government speech). 
 6. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:  Lessons from Congressional 
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 577 (2008) (defining “soft law” to include government speech 
that does not have legally coercive status—that is, government expression “that do[es] not 
have the force of law”). 
 7. E.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591–92 (4th Cir.) 
(relying on President Trump’s speech as evidence that his administration’s proposed ban on 
travel from certain primarily Muslim countries—referred to above as “hard law”—was 
motivated by impermissible anti-Muslim animus in violation of the Establishment Clause), 
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 8. Fearmongering and lying do not describe mutually exclusive categories of government 
expression. 
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emanates from the president and other members of the federal executive 
branch, this Article also explores the wartime expression of federal 
legislative and judicial branch actors and state and local government officials.  
In so doing, this Article considers speech by a government body itself (e.g., 
reports issued by an executive agency or a legislative committee), as well as 
speech by a government official empowered to speak for a government body 
(e.g., the president, the secretary of homeland security, a governor, or a police 
chief).9  Second, this Article does not insist upon any particular definition of 
“war” or “wartime.”  Instead, it considers the government’s speech in 
situations where the government itself asserts emergent threats to national 
security from an opponent that may or may not take the form of a nation-
state.10 
I.  THE GOVERNMENT’S FEARMONGERING SPEECH IN WARTIME 
This Part briefly examines the government’s wartime fearmongering—that 
is, its deliberate expressive effort to instill or exacerbate public fear of certain 
individuals or communities through stereotyping and scapegoating. 
Of course, the government need not make such expressive choices.  
Indeed, the government can choose to use its voice in wartime instead to 
include and unite.  The government’s apologies for its misconduct, for 
example, can help heal and reconcile.  Illustrations include Congress’s 
(belated) apologies to Japanese American citizens wrongly interned during 
World War II:  “For these fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties 
and constitutional rights of these individuals of Japanese ancestry, the 
Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.”11 
 
 9. This Article does not address the very different constitutional issues raised when 
government employees speak in their personal, rather than official, capacities and can thus 
assert First Amendment rights of their own. See generally Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 
2377–83 (2014) (discussing the First Amendment rights of individual public employees); 
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–74 (1968) (same). 
 10. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME 5 (2012) (“Built into the very essence of our idea 
of wartime is the assumption that war is temporary.  The beginning of a war is the opening of 
an era that will, by definition, come to an end.  When we look at the full time line of American 
military conflicts, however, including the ‘small wars’ and the so-called forgotten wars, there 
are not many years of peacetime.  This shows us that war is not an exception to normal 
peacetime, but instead an enduring condition.”). 
 11. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY:  THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 169 (2016) (“In 1976, . . . President Gerald Ford issued a proclamation 
condemning the internment.  In 1980, Congress created the Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians to study the issue.  Three years later, and nearly forty 
years after the Korematsu decision, the commission unequivocally denounced the internment, 
and called for an official apology and reparations . . . .  In 1988, Congress passed and Reagan 
signed the Civil Liberties Act, which provided $20,000 for each interned Japanese American, 
and contained an extraordinary official apology.”).  In 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General 
acknowledged its own complicity in these events in an admission of error (another type of 
government speech). See Neal Katyal, Confession of Error:  The Solicitor General’s Mistakes 
During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES (May 20, 
2011), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-
mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/884T-HP2E]. 
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More important, government speakers can—and sometimes do—
affirmatively reject appeals to division and hatred in the midst of war (rather 
than decades later).  As one illustration shows, President George W. Bush 
repudiated anti-Muslim bigotry in a speech at a mosque immediately after 
the September 11, 2001, attacks.  There, the president emphasized Islam as a 
religion of peace and the “incredibly valuable contribution[s]” Muslim 
Americans make to the United States as “doctors, lawyers, law professors, 
members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads.”12  He 
emphasized the need for Americans to treat their fellow citizens with respect 
and stated that anything less “represents the worst of humankind” and that 
“[t]hose who feel like they can intimidate our fellow citizens . . . should be 
ashamed of that kind of behavior.”13 
Related examples include New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
impassioned defense of plans to build a mosque near the site of the former 
World Trade Center in lower Manhattan in 2010: 
Let us not forget that Muslims were among those murdered on 9/11 and 
that our Muslim neighbors grieved with us as New Yorkers and as 
Americans.  We would betray our values—and play into our enemies’ 
hands—if we were to treat Muslims differently than anyone else.  In fact, 
to cave to popular sentiment would be to hand a victory to the terrorists—
and we should not stand for that.14 
For similar reasons, President Barack Obama expressly chose not to use 
the phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” to avoid associating terrorism with 
Islam as a religion.15  In its War on Terror, the Obama administration 
consistently prioritized a message of tolerance and antidiscrimination for 
instrumental as well as moral reasons: 
[W]e must remember that just as our words and deeds can either fuel or 
counter violent ideologies abroad, so too can they here at home.  Actions 
and statements that cast suspicion toward entire communities, promote 
hatred and division, and send messages to certain Americans that they are 
somehow less American because of their faith or how they look, reinforce 
violent extremist propaganda and feed the sense of disenchantment and 
disenfranchisement that may spur violent extremist radicalization. 
. . . . 
We must do everything in our power to protect the American people 
from violent extremism while protecting the civil rights and civil liberties 
of every American.  Protecting our fundamental rights and liberties is an 
important end in itself, and also helps counter violent extremism by 
 
 12. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Islamic Center of 
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/09/20010917-11.html [https://perma.cc/V89B-7SJY]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, Defending Religious Tolerance:  Remarks at the 
Mosque Near Ground Zero (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-
bloomberg/mayor-bloomberg-on-the-ne_b_669338.html [https://perma.cc/F5Q9-9H5R]. 
 15. See William Cummings, Why Obama Won’t Say ‘Radical Islamic Terrorist,’ USA 
TODAY (Sept. 28, 2016, 7:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/onpolitics/2016/09/28/obama-town-hall/91245328/ [https://perma.cc/9CAR-4S8T]. 
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ensuring nonviolent means for addressing policy concerns; safeguarding 
equal and fair treatment; and making it more difficult for violent extremists 
to divide our communities.16 
At other times, however, the government has asserted its expressive power 
to instill fear and hatred and to wound, exclude, and divide.  In so doing, 
government speakers in wartime have often targeted immigrants, the 
government’s critics, and others perceived as “outsiders.”  As Geoffrey Stone 
observes, “Fear has proved a potent political weapon.”17 
Early examples of the government’s wartime fearmongering include 
Federalists’ inflammatory speech and character assassination that 
exaggerated the danger of war with France.  This fearmongering encouraged 
not only the suppression of speech (through the enactment of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts) but also acts of violence against those perceived to be 
disloyal.18  Government actors during World War I similarly invited hatred 
of German immigrants in the United States.  President Woodrow Wilson, for 
example, claimed that “the agents and dupes of the Imperial German 
Government” were actively engaged in a “sinister intrigue” within the United 
States and that “many of our own people were corrupted.”19 
In World War II, government officials offered stereotypes and falsehoods 
to support the internment of thousands of Japanese American citizens.  
Dissenting from the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the internment, 
Justice Frank Murphy described the government’s fearmongering speech in 
detail: 
That this forced exclusion was the result in good measure of this 
erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity 
is evidenced by the Commanding General’s Final Report on the evacuation 
from the Pacific Coast area.  In it he refers to all individuals of Japanese 
descent as “subversive,” as belonging to “an enemy race” whose “racial 
strains are undiluted,” and as constituting “over 112,000 potential enemies 
. . . at large today” along the Pacific Coast.  In support of this blanket 
condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no reliable 
evidence is cited to show that such individuals were generally disloyal, or 
had generally so conducted themselves in this area as to constitute a special 
menace to defense installations or war industries, or had otherwise by their 
behavior furnished reasonable ground for their exclusion as a group. 
. . . . 
 
 16. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES 7 (Aug. 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2U2-EHQE]. 
 17. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy:  A Cautionary Tale, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1388–89 (2005). 
 18. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 27–28 (2004); 
see also id. at 74 (“[A]s the events of 1798 illustrate, those in power may exploit a threat to 
the nation’s security to serve their partisan ends.  A time-honored strategy for consolidating 
power is to inflate the public’s fears, inflame its patriotism, and then condemn political 
opponents as ‘disloyal.’  A national crisis (real, fabricated, or imagined) invites this strategy.”). 
 19. President Woodrow Wilson, Address on Flag Day (June 14, 1917), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65400 [https://perma.cc/8H26-UVKP]. 
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A military judgment based upon such racial and sociological considerations 
is not entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon 
strictly military considerations.  Especially is this so when every charge 
relative to race, religion, culture, geographical location, and legal and 
economic status has been substantially discredited by independent studies 
made by experts in these matters.20 
Shortly thereafter, the Cold War21 brought an extensive and destructive 
cycle of the government’s fearmongering speech intended to silence political 
opposition.  Examples include the FBI’s spread of defamatory falsehoods 
about the government’s critics during the 1950s and 1960s.22 
As this period illuminates, legislative bodies as well as the executive 
branch can engage in fearmongering expression.  The Senate’s Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) engaged in expression 
that encouraged private parties’ acts of retaliation against its targets through 
firing, blacklisting, and even physical violence.23  One HUAC chair 
explained that “the committee’s goal was to expose Communists and fellow 
travelers ‘before their neighbors and fellow workers,’ with the ‘confidence’ 
that loyal Americans ‘will do the rest of the job.’”24  Indeed, as Justice Hugo 
Black explained when he dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the 
contempt conviction of a witness who declined to answer some of HUAC’s 
questions, the committee sought to punish its targets through “humiliation 
and public shame.  There is nothing strange or novel about this kind of 
punishment.  It is in fact one of the oldest forms of governmental punishment 
 
 20. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235–40 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
see also Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1418–22 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting 
Mr. Korematsu’s coram nobis petition and describing evidence of government lies in the 
earlier proceedings). 
 21. See DUDZIAK, supra note 10, at 73 (“Cold War-era warfare included major wars in 
Korea and Vietnam, but also smaller-scale military engagements in Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, and the Middle East.”). 
 22. See STONE, supra note 18, at 490 (“In its effort to destabilize and incapacitate the left, 
FBI agents wrote letters to employers to cause the firing of antiwar activists; . . . sent 
anonymous letters to campaign contributors and other supporters of antiwar candidates to 
sabotage their campaigns; mailed anonymous letters to the spouses of antiwar activists, 
suggesting that their partners were having extramarital affairs; and spread false rumors that 
individuals were embezzling funds or secretly cooperating with the FBI.”). 
 23. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. 
L. REV. 449, 458 (1985) (“The Hollywood Blacklist struggle of 1947–53 left a residue of 
broken careers, expatriate talents, and extreme reluctance on the part of film studios to address 
controversial subjects or portray social conditions of potential political significance.  The 
character of the trade union movement was permanently . . . altered by the expulsion during 
the anti-Communist purges of the 1950s of some of its most skillful, uncompromising, and 
incorruptible leaders.”). 
 24. STONE, supra note 18, at 372; see also id. at 332 (“‘We have seen the character of 
private citizens and of Government employees virtually destroyed by public condemnation on 
the basis of gossip, distortion, hearsay and deliberate untruths.’  [The Tydings Committee] 
found that the ‘methods employed’ to give McCarthy’s charges of disloyalty in the State 
Department ‘ostensible validity . . . are a fraud and a hoax perpetrated on the Senate . . . and 
the American people.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 81-2108, at 151–52 (1950)). 
2017] GOVERNMENT SPEECH 549 
known to mankind; branding, the pillory, ostracism and subjection to public 
hatred being but a few examples of it.”25 
McCarthy in particular shamed and muzzled not only his targets but other 
governmental officials as well.  Indeed, the conspicuous absence of 
counterspeech by other government actors enabled McCarthy to thrive for as 
long as he did.  As one of many examples, President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
abandoned plans to defend General George Marshall from McCarthy’s verbal 
assaults.26  Eisenhower’s silence only encouraged further attacks by 
McCarthy.27  For years, Republicans in Congress similarly declined to 
challenge their fellow party member because they found that his 
fearmongering worked to their political advantage.28  Only after Senate 
oversight hearings finally exposed his overreaching did McCarthy’s 
popularity drop sufficiently to embolden the Senate to vote to censure him 
for “contemptuous” and “reprehensible” conduct.29 
The Trump administration has continued the trend of government 
fearmongering in its War on Terror through expressive choices that 
intentionally exclude, divide, and marginalize.  As candidate for president, 
Trump called for the “total and complete shutdown of Muslims” entering the 
country.30  As president-elect, he tweeted a threat to dissenters:  “Nobody 
should be allowed to burn the American flag—if they do, there must be 
consequences—perhaps loss of citizenship or year in jail!”31  As president, 
Trump has chosen to use the pejorative term “radical Islam”32 that Presidents 
Bush and Obama expressly eschewed. 
State and local governments, like the federal government, can also engage 
in hurtful fearmongering speech in wartime.33  Recent examples from the 
 
 25. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 154–54 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 26. See HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND 285 (2015) (“[Eisenhower] fail[ed] to 
deliver a planned defense in a campaign speech of his mentor George Marshall, then under a 
particularly scurrilous attack by Joseph McCarthy.  News of the deletion only encouraged the 
senator.”). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Stone, supra note 17, at 1396; see also STONE, supra note 18, at 389 (“[A]s James 
Reston noted at the time, although McCarthy’s public support had dwindled, it is a precept of 
most politicians that ‘you never antagonize any group . . . if you can avoid it,’ and if ‘you have 
to choose between two groups, you always choose to antagonize the one that is less vindictive.’  
In this instance, that was ‘certainly not the pro-McCarthy crowd.’”). 
 29. See Stone, supra note 17, at 1401–03.  Such a censure offers another example of 
government speech—in this case, counterspeech that seeks to influence other governmental 
actors’ expressive choices. 
 30. Press Release, Donald J. Trump, Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration (Dec. 
7, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20170301013409/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/ 
press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-preventing-muslim-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/NW3Q-3CST]. 
 31. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2016, 3:55 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/803567993036754944 [https://perma.cc/76WS-
5PEG]. 
 32. See Andrew E. Kramer, The Phrase Putin Never Uses About Terrorism (and Trump 
Does), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/europe/ 
vladimir-putin-donald-trump-terrorism.html [https://perma.cc/T5BM-6KQH]. 
 33. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 18, at 291 (describing inflammatory charges against 
Japanese American citizens by the California legislature’s Joint Immigration Committee). 
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War on Terror include the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) use of 
training videos that portrayed Muslims in stereotypically negative and 
inaccurate ways.  One film announced that “the true agenda of much of Islam 
in America” is “to infiltrate and dominate America.”34  The NYPD eventually 
abandoned use of the videos in response to public criticism.35  Attorney 
General Eric Holder ultimately repudiated the FBI’s use of similar training 
materials and stated that such materials “really have a negative impact on our 
ability to communicate effectively.”36 
The government has long included the press among the targets of its 
fearmongering speech.37  John Adams’s Federalist administration 
infamously employed the Sedition Act in response to “the first mass media 
in our history, the Republican papers that organized political opposition to 
the administration and ran inflamed articles condemning its policies.”38  
More recent efforts along these lines include those of the Nixon 
administration, as summarized by journalist David Wise: 
To the extent that the public could be persuaded, through such attacks, 
to doubt the credibility, accuracy, and impartiality of the American press, 
attention would, of course, be diverted from the question of the 
administration’s own credibility.  If the viewer can be goaded to kick the 
tube when Walter Cronkite appears, he may be less likely to vent his anger 
at Richard Nixon.  This, at any rate, was the administration’s theory, and it 
had a remarkable degree of short-range success.  Doubt was cast on the 
credibility of the press, and latent hostility toward the television networks 
and the news media in general was crystallized and exploited.39 
 
 34. See Michael Powell, In Police Training, a Dark Film on U.S. Muslims, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/nyregion/in-police-training-a-dark-
film-on-us-muslims.html [https://perma.cc/98DV-97K5]. 
 35. See id.  After a lawsuit alleged that another of its videos encouraged religious 
profiling, the NYPD settled on terms that required it to remove the materials from its website. 
See Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 5, Raza v. City of New York, No. 1:13-cv-03448-
PKC-JO (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2017). 
 36. Spencer Ackerman, Attorney General:  FBI Hurt Terror Fight with ‘Violent Muslim’ 
Training, WIRED (Nov. 8, 2011, 2:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/11/holder-fbi-
islamophobia/ [https://perma.cc/F36Y-J7B5]; see also Spencer Ackerman, FBI ‘Islam 101 
Guide’ Depicted Muslims as 7th Century Simpletons, WIRED (July 27, 2011, 1:27 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2011/07/fbi-islam-101-guide/ [https://perma.cc/WV4K-YRUH]; 
Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents:  ‘Mainstream’ Muslims Are ‘Violent, Radical,’ 
WIRED (Sept. 14, 2011, 8:45 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/ 
[https://perma.cc/6G7M-V4FJ]. 
 37. For a more detailed history of the often antagonistic relationships between presidents 
and the press, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the 
Press, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 2018) (manuscript at 28), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929708 [https://perma.cc/HW2J-
4W7U].  Despite these longstanding tensions, the authors state that “the current situation 
[under the Trump administration] is different in kind, and not just in degree, from past press-
president hostilities, and thus the risks presented by that situation are more severe.” Id. at 21. 
 38. BRUFF, supra note 27, at 54. 
 39. DAVID WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING:  GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND 
POWER 17 (1973); see also Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 23 (“Like Trump, Nixon employed 
war and enemy terminology to characterize [the press].”). 
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President Trump has doubled down on these efforts with expressive 
choices that repeatedly seek to demonize, and thus undermine, the credibility 
of the press.  He branded the press not only “the enemy of the American 
people” but also as incorrigibly dishonest; he stated that “[t]he press has 
become so dishonest that if we don’t talk about [sic], we are doing a 
tremendous disservice to the American people. . . .  We have to talk to find 
out what’s going on, because the press honestly is out of control.  The level 
of dishonesty is out of control.”40  He accused the press of misrepresenting 
his criticism of intelligence officials; he stated that he has “a running war 
with the media,” that “[t]hey are among the most dishonest human beings on 
Earth,”41 and that “they sort of made it sound like I had a feud with the 
intelligence community.”42  He sought to characterize negative press 
coverage of his administration as inevitably false:  “Any negative polls are 
fake news, just like the CNN, ABC, NBC polls in the election.  Sorry, people 
want border security and extreme vetting.”43  In short, he has sought to attack 
and undermine the credibility of the press in an apparent effort to sap it of its 
power to hold him accountable for his own wartime performance.44 
Not only has President Trump repeatedly demonized the press, but he has 
also attacked the legitimacy of the judiciary, specifically in the context of the 
War on Terror.  As just one example, he called the jurist who first issued a 
preliminary injunction against his travel ban a “so-called judge” and claimed 
that the judge’s actions impeded the fight against terrorism “[b]ecause the 
ban was lifted by a judge, many very bad and dangerous people may be 
pouring into our country. . . .  What is our country coming to when a judge 
can halt a Homeland Security travel ban and anyone, even with bad 
intentions, can come into U.S.?”45  In another tweet, he continued that he 
“[j]ust cannot believe a judge would put our country in such peril.  If 
 
 40. Jenna Johnson & Matea Gold, Trump Calls the Media ‘the Enemy of the American 
People,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/02/17/trump-calls-the-media-the-enemy-of-the-american-people/ 
[https://perma.cc/WTS2-94LU]. 
 41. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Matthew Rosenberg, With False Claims, Trump Attacks 
Media on Turnout and Intelligence Rift, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/politics/trump-white-house-briefing-inauguration-
crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/7V8P-FRUV]. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Glenn Kessler & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fact-Checking President Trump’s News 
Conference, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/02/16/fact-checking-president-trumps-news-conference/ 
[https://perma.cc/LE4U-L4HT]. 
 44. See Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 1, 39 (“The Trump administration, with a rhetoric 
that began during the campaign and burgeoned in the earliest days of Donald Trump’s 
presidency, has engaged in enemy construction of the press, and the risks that accompany that 
characterization are great. . . .  [E]nemy construction of the press can pave the way for the 
invocation of Schmittian exceptionalism that justifies limitation on press freedoms and thus 
subverts the important watchdog, educator, and proxy roles of the press.”).  
 45. See Eugene Scott & Allie Malloy, Trump Attacks Another Federal Judge, CNN (Feb. 
5, 2017, 7:38 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/donald-trump-attacks-federal-
judge-travel-ban/index.html [https://perma.cc/2ZQN-QNAW].  
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something happens blame him and court system.  People pouring in.  Bad!”46  
As summarized by Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel, the Trump administration 
has been unusually willing to engage in a “blame-shifting narrative to reduce 
the future checking power of institutions like the judiciary and the media, 
especially in the wake of a terrorist attack.”47 
To be sure, the government generally defends its fearmongering speech in 
wartime as a necessary response to emergent threats to national security.48  
But even if demonization of some “enemy” may be inevitable in wartime 
(and sometimes constructive as a tool for mobilization),49 vulnerable 
individuals and groups pay an unacceptably steep price when the government 
chooses its targets based on stereotypes and falsehoods rather than on 
evidence.50 
II.  THE GOVERNMENT’S LIES ABOUT WAR 
The preceding Part addressed the government’s fearmongering speech in 
wartime that threatens harm to the individuals and communities specifically 
targeted by such expression.  This Part turns to the government’s wartime 
lies that inflict harm upon the American people more generally by frustrating 
political accountability and eroding public trust. 
War usually occurs in situations of great epistemic uncertainty that invite 
a range of government responses in resolving such confusion.51  Here too, 
the government’s expressive choices offer possibilities for both great value 
and great harm.  In some cases, the government’s speech that explains its 
justifications for war and its wartime decisions can inform and inspire.  
President Abraham Lincoln’s wartime speech, as an illustration, often 
 
 46. See David Lawler, Donald Trump Travel Ban:  ‘Blame Judge and Courts if America 
Is Attacked’—President Hits Out Ahead of Legal Battle, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 6, 2017, 11:41 
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/04/donald-trump-slams-so-called-judge-
blocked-ban-vows-overturn/ [https://perma.cc/PVY6-UVD2]. 
 47. Curtis Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Judicial and Media Independence After the Next 
Attack, LAWFARE (Feb. 9, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/judicial-and-media-
independence-after-next-attack [https://perma.cc/VP7F-CC2T]. 
 48. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, WHY LEADERS LIE 7 (2011) (“But the fact is that there are good 
strategic reasons for leaders to lie to their publics as well as to other countries.  These practical 
logics already override well-known and widely accepted moral strictures against lying.  
Indeed, leaders sometimes think that they have a moral duty to lie to protect their country.”). 
 49. See Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 36 (“For many political communities, defining the 
enemy can be a mechanism for defining the community itself—for clarifying both its values 
and its boundaries—and thus an important mechanism for increasing social cohesion.”). 
 50. See Blasi, supra note 23, at 464 (“[A]s Zechariah Chafee has demonstrated so well, 
when the collectivist thinking that is necessary for a war effort takes hold, officials, judges, 
and the public at large tend to overestimate dramatically either the level of cooperation 
required to effectuate the goals of the community or the extent to which the achievement of 
sufficient cooperation requires the stifling of dissent.”). 
 51. E.g., W.J. West, Introduction to GEORGE ORWELL, ORWELL:  THE WAR 
COMMENTARIES 11, 17 (W.J. West ed., 1985) (“Since the sea and air wars were wars without 
frontiers they made highly suitable material for the propaganda war. . . .  Japanese radio refers 
to a sea battle in the Pacific as one of the greatest Japanese naval victories of all time; Orwell 
quotes American sources describing it as a defeat for Japan which has started a process leading 
to her ultimate collapse.  Only the passage of time would enable listeners to tell which side 
was right.”). 
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exemplified expressive deliberation, reflection, and a reluctance to attack 
others’ motives, character, and loyalty.52  Recall not only Lincoln’s plea for 
“malice toward none, with charity for all” in his second inaugural address,53 
but also his public response to critics of the Emancipation Proclamation in 
which he explained the wartime rationale for his decision: 
You say you will not fight to free negroes.  Some of them seem willing 
to fight for you; but, no matter.  Fight you, then, exclusively to save the 
Union.  I issued the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union.  
Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall 
urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time, then, for you to declare 
you will not fight to free negroes. 
I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the 
negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the 
enemy in his resistance to you.  Do you think differently?  I thought that 
whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for 
white soldiers to do, in saving the Union.  Does it appear otherwise to you?  
But negroes, like other people, act upon motives.  Why should they do any 
thing for us, if we will do nothing for them?  If they stake their lives for us, 
they must be prompted by the strongest motive—even the promise of 
freedom.  And the promise being made, must be kept.54 
At other times, in contrast, the government has lied about its wartime 
actions and their justifications—that is, it has made deliberately or recklessly 
false assertions of fact with the intent that its listeners understand them to be 
true.  The government’s lies regarding national security and intelligence 
where it has near-monopoly access pose especially grave instrumental threats 
to democratic self-governance.55 
For example, the government at times obscures or conceals the reasons for 
its decisions about military intervention through false or misleading claims 
of threats to national security.  Illustrations include President James Polk’s 
misrepresentation of the events that led the United States to declare war 
 
 52. See JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 83 (1987) (“Lincoln’s most 
specific policy pronouncements are those in which he justifies war activity after the fact.  The 
most important of these are his defenses of suspension of habeas corpus and of martial law in 
two replies to addresses.  Carefully choosing written arguments made to him, he too responds 
in the written form of a public letter.  These documents are extraordinary for both their detail 
and their power of argument.”). 
 53. President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln2.asp [https://perma.cc/F4B2-94JL]. 
 54. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James C. Conkling (Aug. 26, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 407, 409 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (footnotes omitted). 
 55. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond:  Observations on the Prospect 
of Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before the Use of Force, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 433, 444 (2010) (“[President Bush] and his top officials relied on controlled 
information release in a number of ways to support their use of force advocacy.  That they 
withheld much information within their control meant that they could rely upon the public’s 
knowledge that they had superior access to the entire body of existing information to 
characterize the facts with greater certainty than the content of the information reflected, to 
omit mention of dissent, to suggest that they had more and better quality information than they 
presented, and to ask the public to embrace the truth of the threat claims based on trust rather 
than proof.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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against Mexico,56 the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s 
misrepresentations of the incidents that triggered broader U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam57 as well as its reasons for military intervention in the Dominican 
Republic,58 and the George W. Bush administration’s misrepresentation of 
the evidence supporting its invasion of Iraq.59  As David Wise explained with 
respect to the Johnson administration’s expressive choices, the government’s 
falsehoods to justify its military intervention can threaten death, devastation 
to natural and financial resources, and other shattering harms: 
Often, in the foreign policy and national security area, what the 
government says is the news.  The Tonkin Gulf episode was a classic 
illustration of this.  The public was told that on August 4 two American 
warships on “routine patrol” had, in Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s 
words, been under “continuous torpedo attack” by North Vietnamese PT 
boats; in response, Lyndon Johnson ordered the first bombing attack on 
North Vietnam and pushed the Tonkin Gulf resolution through Congress, 
thereby acquiring a blank check to escalate the war.  Later it became clear 
that there had been much confusion and considerable doubt within the 
government as to whether any PT-boat attack had taken place at all.  The 
public, however, had to rely entirely on Lyndon Johnson and Robert 
McNamara for their news of the incident.  If the details seem unimportant 
in the larger tapestry of the war, we need only recall that at the time 163 
Americans had died in Vietnam.60 
Relatedly, sometimes the government lies about how well its war efforts 
are going.  During World War II, the government misrepresented the extent 
of its losses at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere.61  During the Vietnam War, 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told government employee Daniel 
Ellsberg in private that the addition of 100,000 U.S. troops had resulted in no 
 
 56. See BRUFF, supra note 27, at 114. 
 57. See id. at 318–19 (“Johnson’s sponsorship of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to authorize 
the war involved deception about both the facts and the president’s intentions, setting the stage 
for a repetition of these sins that would eventually destroy his presidency.  It is one thing to 
find oneself in a strategic bind and quite another to try to work out of it behind a bodyguard 
of lies.”); id. at 321 (“As he escalated the war, LBJ repeatedly denied doing so, in an effort to 
protect the viability of his domestic initiatives and to preserve the option of withdrawing 
without seeming defeated.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58. Id. at 323 (“Johnson misled Congress and the public by claiming the intervention [to 
send troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965] was an attempt to protect American lives, 
when it was in fact actuated by a concern that the new government might be leftist.  This 
poorly conceived intervention gave way to an authoritarian regime that lasted a quarter 
century.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 59. See Jacobs, supra note 55, at 440–41 (“We know now that these threat claims were 
not true. . . .  With the facts misunderstood, Congress members and the public consented to 
the use of force based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the policy choice to be made.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 60. WISE, supra note 39, at 27–28. 
 61. See STONE, supra note 18, at 279 (“After Pearl Harbor, Secretary of the Navy Knox 
gave a flagrantly misleading report of the extent of American losses, and as the Japanese swept 
through Singapore, Hong Kong, and Manila in the spring of 1942 the military did its best to 
cover up the magnitude of each defeat.”).  
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military progress—only to report great improvement to an audience of 
journalists ten minutes later.62  As the Pentagon Papers eventually revealed, 
lying was permitted throughout the ranks of all governmental services [in 
the Vietnam War], military and civilian—the phony body counts of the 
“search-and-destroy” missions, the doctored after-damage reports of the air 
force, the “progress” reports to Washington from the field written by 
subordinates who knew that their performance would be evaluated by their 
own reports.63 
Note too that the Pentagon Papers themselves—commissioned by Secretary 
McNamara for the government’s use and written by government employees 
and contractors—offer an example of salutary government expression 
because of what they exposed about the government’s deceitful wartime 
speech. 
The government sometimes lies about what it is actually doing in wartime.  
Examples include the Nixon administration’s lies about its decision to bomb 
Cambodia,64 the Bush administration’s misrepresentations of its 
interrogation tactics with respect to suspected terrorists,65 and Obama 
administration officials’ falsehoods about the sweep of its domestic 
surveillance and data collection efforts.66 
The trend continues.  In the contemporary War on Terror, for example, the 
Trump administration has made inaccurate charges about immigrant 
involvement in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil to justify its proposed travel ban 
and related measures.67  President Trump also claimed that the press had 
 
 62. See id. at 501. 
 63. HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 4 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 
 64. See BRUFF, supra note 27, at 328 (“Nixon tried to solve the legal difficulty by keeping 
the bombing [of Cambodia] secret and ordering military records falsified to conceal it.  This 
tactic foreclosed any possibility that approval by Congress or the people legitimated the 
action.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65. See David Cole, If Those Techniques Were Approved, Why Did the CIA Still Lie About 
Torture?, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-the-
interrogation-program-was-approved-why-did-the-cia-still-lie-about-it/2014/12/12/e858eeec-
8162-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7 [https://perma.cc/F79L-KN7K] (describing then-CIA 
Director Michael Hayden as “misrepresent[ing] virtually every aspect of the [CIA’s coercive 
interrogation] program to the [Senate Select] Committee [on Intelligence]” in April 2007 
testimony and referencing a committee report listing misrepresentations about the program’s 
genesis, interrogators’ qualifications and training, the ability to stop interrogation at any time, 
whether interrogators punched targets or threatened to kill their family members, number of 
detainees, specific abusive conduct, effectiveness of waterboarding, and other “coercive 
tactics”). 
 66. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy:  National Security 
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 467 (2014) (describing Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper’s testimony to Congress). 
 67. See Linda Qiu, Fact-Checking Assertions About the President’s Travel Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/politics/fact-checking-
claims-about-trumps-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/594M-E9FS] (“According to the New 
America Foundation, all 12 jihadist terrorists who have killed people in the United States since 
Sept. 11, 2001, were American citizens or permanent residents, and none had ties to the seven 
countries named in Mr. Trump’s [original] executive order.”); see also Fred Barbash & Derek 
Hawkins, Trump’s Loose Talk About Muslims Gets Weaponized in Court Against Travel Ban, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/ 
02/07/words-matter-trumps-loose-talk-about-muslims-gets-weaponized-in-court-against-
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failed to report acts of terrorism:  “ISIS is on a campaign of genocide, 
committing atrocities across world. . . .  It’s gotten to a point where it’s not 
even being reported.  And in many cases, the very, very dishonest press 
doesn’t want to report it.”68  Along the same lines, then-candidate Trump 
falsely claimed that Arabs in New Jersey had publicly celebrated the 9/11 
attacks.69 
To be sure, the government sometimes engages in wartime deception to 
achieve various national security and foreign policy purposes.  For example, 
the John F. Kennedy administration’s deceptions during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis included not only lies regarding what it knew about the presence of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba but also lies about the negotiated terms for the 
missiles’ withdrawal.70  Kennedy Press Secretary Arthur Sylvester later 
suggested a governmental duty to lie in certain circumstances: 
Government officials as individuals do not have the right to lie politically 
or to protect themselves, but they do always have the duty to protect their 
countrymen. . . .  Sometimes, and those times are rare indeed, Government 
officials may be required to fulfill their duty by issuing a false statement to 
deceive a potential enemy, as in the Cuban missile crisis.71 
Governmental lies motivated by public purposes are sometimes morally 
and instrumentally justifiable, as I have suggested elsewhere: 
In certain rare circumstances, the government’s decision to lie [in ways that 
cause or coerce the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty] may 
survive strict scrutiny when necessary to achieve compelling government 
 
travel-ban [https://perma.cc/RN4M-YFF4] (“Trump again called for a ‘ban’ after the Pulse 
nightclub shooting in June, the deadliest mass shooting in U.S. history.  He framed the attack 
as an immigration issue, even though the shooter was a U.S. citizen born in New York to 
Afghan parents.”). 
 68. Philip Rucker, ‘If Something Happens’:  Trump Points His Finger in Case of a 
Terrorist Attack, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), http://wapo.st/2jVOJ6S 
[https://perma.cc/9MJV-TL9X]; see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Says Journalists 
‘Have Their Reasons’ to Play Down Terror Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/politics/donald-trump-centcom.html 
[https://perma.cc/C495-VWV6] (“The president’s comments on Monday were reminiscent of 
his claim during a visit last month to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in 
Langley, Va., that the news media had fabricated his feud with the intelligence community.  
Those remarks came only days after he likened American intelligence officials to Nazis, after 
several weeks in which he had denigrated their work.”). 
 69. Glenn Kessler & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, President Trump’s Cascade of False Claims 
in Time’s Interview on His Falsehoods, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/03/23/president-trumps-
cascade-of-false-claims-in-times-interview-on-his-falsehoods/?utm_term=.9c88coacbb51 
[https://perma.cc/VJ8B-4J4N]. 
 70. See Arthur Sylvester, The Government Has the Right to Lie, SATURDAY EVENING 
POST, Nov. 18, 1967, at 10 (acknowledging that during the Cuban Missile Crisis President 
Kennedy knowingly approved a press release falsely stating that “the Pentagon has no 
information indicating the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba”); see also BRUFF, supra 
note 27, at 305 (describing how “[l]ying, [President Kennedy] denied that [the removal of 
American missiles from Turkey] was a quid pro quo for Cuba” and that “[t]he shield of lies 
with which President Kennedy hid his trade of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba was 
constructed to meet both international and domestic political considerations” such as 
preventing the displeasure of the Administration’s NATO allies and domestic critics). 
 71. Sylvester, supra note 70, at 14. 
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interests.  This may be the case when time permits no other option—for 
example, where the government’s coercive lies are necessary to calm public 
panic in a public safety emergency or to prevent a criminal from hurting a 
victim.72 
But the government’s lies are rarely necessary to achieve such ends.  Lies 
ostensibly told to mislead military opponents, for example, can instead 
deceive the American public without any offsetting national security benefit.  
As Hannah Arendt observed, the government’s lies during the Vietnam War 
were 
hardly ever aimed at the enemy (this is one of the reasons why the 
[Pentagon P]apers do not reveal any military secrets that could fall under 
the Espionage Act), but [were] destined chiefly, if not exclusively, for 
domestic consumption, for propaganda at home, and especially for the 
purpose of deceiving Congress.  The Tonkin incident, where the enemy 
knew all the facts and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee none, is a 
case in point.73 
As David Wise similarly explained: 
The excuse for secrecy and deception most frequently given by those in 
power is that the American people must sometimes be misled in order to 
mislead the enemy.  This justification is unacceptable on moral and 
philosophic grounds, and often it simply isn’t true.  Frequently the “enemy” 
knows what is going on, but the American public does not.74 
In short, the government’s wartime lies to achieve public purposes can be 
justified on moral and instrumental grounds when they are actually necessary 
to achieving such purposes—but often they are not.  Instead, such lies 
sometimes have the intent or effect of insulating the government from 
political and legal accountability for its wartime decisions.75 
III.  ADDRESSING THE GOVERNMENT’S HARMFUL WARTIME SPEECH 
This Part discusses possible responses to the government’s fearmongering 
and deliberately false wartime speech that threaten significant harm, 
proposing a range of constitutional, structural, political, and expressive 
suggestions for influencing the government’s expressive choices.  In so 
doing, it addresses a variety of possible actors and audiences that include 
courts and lawyers, other government officials, the press, and the public more 
broadly. 
 
 72. Norton, Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 115. 
 73. ARENDT, supra note 63, at 14. 
 74. WISE, supra note 39, at 344; see also STONE, supra note 18, at 393 (“Certainly, the 
goal of preserving the nation’s security from unlawful espionage, sabotage, and foreign 
influence is legitimate.  Certainly, there were well-justified concerns about these matters 
during the Cold War.  But a democracy is about means as well as ends.  It is not enough to say 
that Joe McCarthy meant well, but went about it the wrong way.  McCarthy violated the 
fundamental norms and the essential values of the American constitutional system.  There is 
simply no excusing, defending, or mitigating that reality.”). 
 75. See SUSAN A. BREWER, WHY AMERICA FIGHTS:  PATRIOTIC AND WAR PROPAGANDA 
FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO IRAQ 282 (2009) (“[T]he more flawed the policy, the more heavily 
officials have relied on lies and exaggerations to manipulate opinion.”). 
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A.  Constitutional Constraints 
Government expression in wartime may sometimes violate specific 
constitutional guarantees.  This can be so even if the contested government 
speech is otherwise consistent with the principles of separation of powers and 
federalism.  For example, even if the executive’s speech is consistent with 
Article II of the Constitution, that does not mean that it is necessarily 
consistent with the First Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal 
Protection Clause since those provisions have very different purposes.76 
More specifically, as I have described elsewhere, the government’s lies 
and other speech can violate the Due Process Clause when they coerce the 
deprivation of their targets’ life, liberty, or property.  Examples include 
government officials’ lies that coerce their targets’ involuntary waiver of 
constitutional rights, government lies that deprive their subjects of the ability 
to meaningfully exercise voting or other protected rights, and government 
lies to individuals about their constitutionally protected rights (which are 
often the functional equivalent of the government’s refusal to honor those 
rights altogether).77 
Relatedly, I have proposed that the government’s speech can violate the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when it is sufficiently coercive 
of its targets’ beliefs or expression to constitute the functional equivalent of 
the government’s direct regulation of that expressive activity.  Just as a 
government’s criminal sanction or economic reprisal designed to silence 
dissent clearly frustrate First Amendment values, so too can government lies 
and fearmongering squelch critics’ speech.78 
Moreover, government speech at times threatens equal protection values 
by dividing or excluding its targets based on protected-class status.  This 
danger is especially acute in wartime, where possibilities for fearmongering 
and scapegoating abound.  As I have urged elsewhere, we can understand the 
government’s hateful speech as violating the Equal Protection Clause when 
it facilitates or encourages private parties’ discrimination or acts of violence 
against its targets or when it discourages its targets from exercising protected 
rights or pursuing key opportunities.79 
Although I have argued that the government’s speech by itself may 
sometimes run afoul of the Constitution, I also recognize that efforts to 
enforce constitutional constraints on the government’s expression pose 
obstacles and trigger concerns of their own.  These efforts not only invite 
worries about courts’ institutional competence to evaluate such claims but 
 
 76. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534–35 (2004) (holding that certain executive 
branch actions found to be consistent with the Executive’s Article II powers may nonetheless 
violate the Due Process Clause); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 
(1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Individuals must not be left impoverished of their 
constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support.  
Thus, like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the 
military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness 
determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled.”). 
 77. See Norton, Government’s Lies, supra note 5, at 89–99. 
 78. Id. at 99–107. 
 79. Norton, Government’s Hateful Speech, supra note 5, at 194–98. 
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also may be more readily applied to government expression that inflicts 
individualized harm on specific targets than to government speech that 
threatens more collective harms to the general public.80  They may also 
encourage attacks by the government’s critics for partisan rather than 
principled reasons and thus chill the government’s important wartime 
expression. 
These challenges invite us also to consider nonconstitutional means for 
addressing harmful government expression, such as the counterspeech and 
oversight opportunities available to other government officials specifically 
and to the public more generally.  The remainder of this Part sketches a range 
of possibilities. 
B.  Nonconstitutional Constraints 
The president is not the only government speaker with a bully pulpit; other 
governmental leaders can use their public platforms to challenge 
fearmongering and lies.  Indeed, separation of powers principles offer 
structural means for other governmental actors to shape the government’s 
expressive choices through oversight and counterspeech.  For example, 
legislative oversight of the executive’s expressive choices can include 
requiring relevant officials to testify under oath (or in other settings where 
truthfulness is required by law) and denying funding to government agencies 
engaged in lying or other harmful expression.81 
Legislatures can also contribute to the development of what some call 
“internal separation of powers” checks on the executive.82  For example, 
Congress has enacted statutes establishing inspector general (IG) positions 
 
 80. Related concerns in other settings have led courts to develop various justiciability 
doctrines that limit the circumstances under which the judiciary is empowered to review the 
legality of the other branches’ choices.  At the same time, courts have recognized limits on 
and exceptions to these doctrines to help ensure that an independent judiciary remains 
available to check the government in appropriate circumstances. See Norton, Government’s 
Lies, supra note 5, at 85; see also JAMES E. PFANDER, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR 
ON TERROR xviii (2017) (“[T]he federal courts should focus on the narrow (but supremely 
important) task of evaluating the legality of official conduct.  Once that understanding of the 
judicial role has been accepted, existing law furnishes ample tools with which to reach the 
merits of misconduct claims. . . .  One way to accomplish such a return to the merits would be 
to allow litigants to limit themselves to a claim for nominal damages.  Such nominal claims 
would enable the court to reach the constitutional issue in a world of legal uncertainty without 
confronting the officer with a threat of personal liability and triggering the qualified immunity 
defense.”). 
 81. See Louis Fisher, When Wars Begin:  Misleading Statements by Presidents, 40 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 171, 182 (2010) (“Congressional committees need to call executive 
officials to testify, under oath, to defend their public statements about going to war.  To do 
that effectively, lawmakers and their staffs must arm themselves in advance with information 
obtained from executive agencies and from experts outside of government.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Jacobs, supra note 55, at 480 (“When intelligence lapses happen, Congress 
members with responsibility for oversight should be named and asked to identify and explain 
the oversight actions engaged in on their watch.”). 
 82. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006). 
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charged with monitoring various agencies for misconduct.83  These statutes 
broadly empower the IGs to “undertake and carry out audits and 
investigations without interference from agency leadership[,] . . . to access 
documents within and beyond their agencies[,]” and to serve and inform 
Congress along with their agencies.84  Along the same lines, presidents can 
appoint or otherwise establish civil liberties defenders at high levels.85 
In addition, legislatures can enact statutes that prohibit governmental lies 
or otherwise constrain government speech in certain contexts.  Examples 
include the Federal False Statements Act (which prohibits speakers, 
including but not limited to governmental speakers, from lying to federal 
officials) and other statutes that impose affirmative disclosure requirements 
upon government speakers.86  Moreover, legislatures can enact and 
strengthen statutory protections for whistleblowers who can help expose 
government lies and other misconduct.87  Executive branch actors at all levels 
of government can then play a valuable role in vigorously enforcing these 
measures. 
Federalism principles offer similar structural means for governmental 
officials to influence other governmental actors’ expressive choices through 
counterspeech and public pressure.  State attorneys general, for example, can 
reject federal fearmongering not only through litigation but also through their 
own forceful expression.88  Other illustrations include California Supreme 
 
 83. See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within?  Inspectors General and National 
Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013) (describing inspectors general as 
“playing a significant role in monitoring national security practices curtailing individual 
rights”). 
 84. Id. at 1035 (footnote omitted); see also Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, 
Pentagon Clears Officials of Skewing Data in ISIS Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/pentagon-isis-reports.html 
[https://perma.cc/8Z35-8ZXJ] (describing the inspector general’s internal investigation of 
claims that agency reports “were manipulated to present a distorted view of the military 
campaign’s progress”). 
 85. See STONE, supra note 18, at 542; see also Sinnar, supra note 83, at 1036–37 
(“Congress also made explicit a civil rights role for the new [Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)] IG, requiring the IG to designate a senior official to investigate civil rights 
allegations and to work with the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties on policy 
recommendations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 86. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 
165 U. PA. L. REV 1097, 1101 (2017) (“One alternative model for producing executive branch 
transparency involves affirmative disclosure requirements, which can be tailored in a variety 
of ways and enforced by agents such as inspectors general, ombudspersons, and auditors.”). 
 87. Such statutory protections are especially important in light of the Supreme Court’s 
failure to protect many government whistleblowers as a matter of constitutional law. See 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not 
protect public employees’ speech pursuant to their jobs—including their truthful reports of 
government lies and other forms of misconduct—when those reports are part of their official 
duties); see also Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:  Government’s Control 
of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (describing 
multiple cases in which lower courts have invoked Garcetti to permit government employers 
to punish employees who sought to expose the government’s lies and other misconduct). 
 88. See, e.g., Press Release, Lisa Madigan, Ill. Attorney Gen., Attorney General Madigan 
& 15 Other Attorneys General Condemn the Unconstitutional Executive Order on 
Immigration, Vow to Uphold Constitution (Jan. 29, 2017), 
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Court Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye’s letter to Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly requesting that federal 
agents cease arresting undocumented immigrants at courthouses for fear that 
such arrests “may deter immigrants from coming to court for legal matters, 
such as testifying or seeking protective orders from alleged abusers.”89 
In rare circumstances, impeachment may provide a response to certain 
presidential lies or other speech that inflicts egregious democratic harms.  As 
Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel suggest in response to President Trump’s 
efforts to undermine the credibility of checking institutions: 
Another step would be to give more concrete consideration to the 
conditions under which attempts to undermine the judiciary or the media 
should be considered grounds for impeachment.  Ideally, the very act of 
thinking this through and specifying lines that should not be crossed might 
help stave off potential abuses.90 
Relatedly, government and nongovernment lawyers, as well as other actors 
in civil society, can help police and thus shape the government’s especially 
harmful expressive choices.  So too can a vigorous press.91 
Finally, of course, we the people have a substantial role to play in 
responding to the government’s harmful expression, especially during (but 
not limited to) wartime.  Our political and expressive options include voting, 
campaigning, lobbying, petitioning, and protesting.  To be sure, such 
remedies seem especially limited at a time when expressive choices involving 
generosity, nuance, and humility do not appear to reap political rewards.  But 
the public can seek to cultivate habits of mind as both speakers and listeners 
to help influence our leaders’ expressive choices.  On one hand, for example, 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs urges us to remember that “the President speaks as an 
advocate when he presents threat claims,” which means that “listeners must 
evaluate the claims [they] make[], and the evidence [they] present[], as 
advocacy.”92  Thus, they “must attempt, through congressional or media 
inquiry or otherwise, to verify the threat claims that are made.”93  On the 
other hand, as an aspirational matter, Jason Stanley suggests the following: 
 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2017_01/20170129.html 
[https://perma.cc/JT3M-2FVL]. 
 89. See Kristine Phillips, California Chief Justice to ICE:  Stop ‘Stalking’ Immigrants at 
Courthouses, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/03/17/california-chief-justice-to-ice-stop-stalking-immigrants-at-
courthouses/ [https://perma.cc/S9MD-HSWD]; see also id. (quoting the letter as saying, 
“[m]ost Americans have more daily contact with their state and local governments than with 
the federal government, and I am concerned about the impact on public trust and confidence 
in our state court system if the public feels that our state institutions are being used to facilitate 
other goals and objectives, no matter how expedient they may be”).  
 90. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 47; see also id. (“[I]t is essential to continue resisting 
any suggestion that, by doing their jobs, these institutions are to blame for the security failings 
of this administration.”). 
 91. See Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 48–58 (explaining the press’s multiple functions, 
including its fact-checking, informational, and educational roles). 
 92. Jacobs, supra note 55, at 476. 
 93. Id. at 477. 
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A democratic culture is one in which citizens assume that their fellow 
citizens have good reasons for acting as they do.  It involves, for example, 
questioning one’s own perspective, if one cannot make rational sense out 
of the actions of one’s fellow citizens.  It involves, as Du Bois argues, being 
open to the “respectful presentation” of other perspectives.94 
In sum, we can be both more skeptical of our leaders’ speech and 
simultaneously more open to the possibility that we ourselves (and our 
trusted proxies) may be vulnerable to mistake and error. 
CONCLUSION 
Our history and continuing experience show that the government’s 
expressive choices during wartime sometimes threaten grave democratic and 
constitutional harm.  We can teach ourselves to recognize these pathological 
patterns in our government’s wartime expression—such as the 
fearmongering speech that wreaks life-changing damage on those branded as 
dangerous outsiders and the military lies told for the government’s political 
self-interest. 
These threats may be exacerbated in the contemporary War on Terror 
given its potentially unbounded scope in time and space:  the enemy’s 
identity is something other than a traditional nation-state, the battlefield’s 
location includes the homeland as well as the rest of the globe, and the 
conflict has no clear temporal stopping point.95  Indeed, although the 
government’s especially harmful wartime expression in the past generally 
dissipated with the resolution of the military crisis of the day (or its perceived 
political advantage),96 whether and when the current War on Terror will ever 
be resolved remains unclear.97  The Trump administration’s contemporary 
expressive choices also appear unusual not only in the degree to which they 
undermine and destabilize truth-seeking institutions like the media and the 
judiciary but also in the ferocity of their attacks on the concept of truth 
itself.98  Finally, the power of the government’s speech today is intensified—
for better and for worse—by changes in expressive technologies that magnify 
the speed and reach of such expression, increasingly permit the government 
 
 94. JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 104 (2015). 
 95. See DUDZIAK, supra note 10, at 114 (“By the end of the twentieth century, the state 
had dropped out of many definitions of war.  A war on terror was more expansive still:  it was 
a war against a tactic or an ideology, not a single, easily identifiable entity.  And as the 
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 96. See id. at 82–83 (suggesting that the end to the government’s repressive speech-related 
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with the end of the perceived domestic political advantages of Red baiting). 
 97. See id. at 5 (“My aim is to illuminate a conundrum:  we imagine wars to be bound in 
time, but the American experience is to the contrary.  Since 9/11, war has been framed in a 
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 98. See, e.g., Eric Bradner, Conway:  Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative Facts’ on 
Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/ 
kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5L-4KJ8].  
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to bypass the media and speak directly to the public,99 and encourage the 
public’s political polarization.100 
The government’s wartime speech packs great power.  With that power 
comes great responsibility.  Even—and perhaps especially—in times of grave 
crisis, the government’s speech can be soaring in its inspiration, its humanity, 
and in its success in achieving essential public purposes.  At times, however, 
the government’s wartime speech instead threatens, bullies, divides, and 
deceives for self-interested reasons, with sometimes crushingly destructive 
results.  Either way, the government’s expressive choices are just that—
choices—with especially significant effects.  This Article has sought to 
identify some of the motivations for and consequences of those choices, as 
well as possible means for constructively influencing them.  Persistent and 
passionate expressive pushback by other governmental actors and by the 
public more generally has been among the more effective antidotes to the 
government’s especially harmful wartime speech in the past.  As we have 
seen, however, success has rarely been quick or easy—and it remains far 
from inevitable. 
 
 99. See Jones & Sun, supra note 37, at 34 (“Today, for the first time in modern history, a 
president appears to have made the calculation that . . . go-betweens are no longer necessary 
links to the citizenry.  He is emboldened by shifts in the communications landscape and the 
delivery of news that permit the direct, unfiltered communication with the populace.”). 
 100. See id. at 35 (“The strong majority of Americans who are now getting their news from 
social media represent a change not only in news distribution, but also in news content.  Social 
media feeds allow the user to curate news consumption, and users now consume mostly 
material that aligns with and reinforces their ideologies and world views.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
